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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appellant, Meredith Gibson, appeals the Judgment and Order of the Third District Court 
in a wrongful discharge case. She filed this appeal with the Supreme Court pursuant to U.C. 
§78-2-2(3)(j) (1995). Pursuant to its authority in U.C. §78-2-2(4) (1995), the Supreme Court 
assigned this case to the Court of Appeals for its review and disposition. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing the trial court's Summary Judgment, the Court of Appeals, after resolving 
all disputed facts and reasonable inferences in appellant's favor, affirms only if the appellee is 
nonetheless entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hunt v. ESI Engineering, 808 P.2d 1137 
(Utah App. 1991); cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). In this case, the specific issues are: 
1. When appellee ("US West") gives the appellant, Meredith Gibson ("Ms. 
Gibson"), a US West union employee of 18 years, an opportunity to change her position to a 
non-union position, does the promise of US West's Employment Office that her new 
employment would be governed by the union contract create an implied-in-fact contract, or can 
US West ignore its representation and fire her as an "at will" employee? 
2. At the hearing on its motion for summary judgment, may US West attack, for the 
first time, the foundation of Ms. Gibson's testimony (concerning the representations of US 
West's Employment Office); additionally, may US West attack the credibility of Ms. Gibson's 
testimony in a motion for summary judgment? 
3. Assuming that US West's promise to Ms. Gibson is honored, did US West have 
just cause (as required by the union contract) to fire Ms. Gibson where Ms. Gibson's supervisor, 
a US West manager, believed that a verbal reprimand was appropriate under the circumstances? 
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4. Assuming that US West's promise to Ms. Gibson is honored, did US West breach 
its covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it summarily fired Ms. Gibson? 
5. Assuming that US West's promise to Ms. Gibson is honored, is Ms. Gibson 
entitled to damages based on her rights to severance pay? 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Rule 32(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is determinative of part of the 
issues raised on this appeal. That Rule provides: 
(B) Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral examination in the manner 
of taking the deposition, in the form of the questions or answers, in the oath or 
affirmation, or in the conduct of parties, and errors of any kind which might be 
obviated, removed, or cured if promptly presented are waived unless seasonable 
objection thereto is made at the taking of the deposition. 
U.R.C.P. Rule 32(c)(3)(B) (1995). There are no other constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances or rules that are determinative of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Upon being terminated by US West after nearly 20 years of exemplary service, Meredith 
Gibson sued US West, inter alia, for wrongful discharge, breach her employment contract's 
implied covenant of good faith and severance pay. US West moved for summary judgment, and 
the Salt Lake County Third District Court granted its motion. During its argument, US West 
had, for the first time, challenged the foundation of Ms. Gibson's deposition testimony 
concerning a promise made to her to treat her as an employee under US West's collective 
bargaining agreement with the Communications Workers of America. Accordingly, Ms. Gibson 
moved the Court to reverse its judgment on the basis that US West had violated provisions of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure designed to protect parties from surprise. The Court denied Ms. 
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Gibson's motion. Ms. Gibson then filed this appeal. Her appeal is limited to her claims of 
wrongful termination, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and for severance pay. 
FACTS 
Meredith Gibson joined Mountain Bell, US West's predecessor, in 1971. R.124. Until 
1989, Ms. Gibson worked as a union employee subject to the contract between US West and the 
Communications Workers of America. R.124. Ms. Gibson's work record was excellent. R.665. 
In 1989, US West offered Ms. Gibson the opportunity to work in US West's Salt Lake 
City Security Office. R.664. She also learned that the Security Office was a non bargained for 
unit (meaning that employment in that office was not covered by the union contract). R.664. 
Before accepting the position, Ms. Gibson went to US West's Employment Office and asked 
how she would be treated if she accepted the position in the Security Office. R.664. The US 
West Employment Office advised Ms. Gibson that her employment would be governed by the 
union contract. R.664-65. Based on that representation, Ms. Gibson accepted the Security 
Office position. R.665. 
In the Security Office, Ms. Gibson's immediate supervisor was Daniel Gomez, a US 
West Manager. R. 663, 665. US West repeatedly advised Mr. Gomez that he was to treat US 
West's union employees and its non union employees the same. R.665. Mr. Gomez acted 
accordingly. R.665. Other US West managers advised Ms. Gibson prior to her employment in 
the Security Office that US West would treat its union and non-union employees the same. 
R.285-87. Thus, Ms. Gibson saw that US West's promise coincided with how in fact she was 
treated. R.667. 
The union contract provided that employees could only be fired for "just cause." R.668-
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69. It further grants tenured employees like Ms. Gibson the right to challenge any US West 
action and require the dispute be resolved by mediation, binding arbitration, or mediation 
followed by binding arbitration. R.669. 
As part of Ms. Gibson's duties, she handled teleabuse (customer complaints concerning 
annoying, abusive or threatening telephone calls). R.125. Ms. Gibson worked with Mary 
Tolman. R.125. Ms. Tolman handled all court ordered wire taps. R.125. When Ms. Gibson 
was on vacation, Ms. Tolman handled Ms. Gibson's duties. R.125. 
On about December 20, 1990, Ms. Tolman received a letter from Brenda Mehl 
authorizing US West to establish a trap and trace on her telephone line. R.128. Ms. Gibson was 
on vacation. R. 129. Thus, Ms. Tolman called Ms. Mehl and confirmed the number of lines 
upon which a trap and trace should be placed. R.129. Thereafter, Ms. Tolman called Ms. 
Gibson at her home. R.666. Ms. Gibson was not available to take the call. R.129. Ms. Tolman 
advised Mr. Gibson that she had received a trap and trace request from a "Brenda" in Kaysville. 
R.666. She further stated that she knew that Ms. Gibson's sister was named Brenda and lived in 
the Kaysville area, but that she couldn't remember Ms. Gibson's sister's last name. R.666. Mr. 
Gibson advised Ms. Tolman that Ms. Gibson's sister's name was Carlson-Butcher, and Ms. 
Tolman concluded the call. R.187. Mr. Gibson later told his wife of Ms. Tolman's call. R.129. 
Later that same day, Ms. Gibson and her husband went to her sister Brenda's home to 
borrow a carpet cleaner. R. 187. Upon arriving at the home, Brenda told the Gibsons she had just 
concluded an unpleasant telephone conversation with her ex-husband and that she hung up on 
him. R.187. Brenda then complained about her ex-husband's calls. R.250. Ms. Gibson noted a 
Brenda in Kaysville had sought a trap and trace that day, that Ms. Tolman had wondered if it was 
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Brenda, and that maybe Brenda should consider getting a trap and trace on her ex-husband. 
R.250. Brenda said it wasn't her, but that she would think about the trap and trace. R.250-51. 
During this conversation, Brenda's boyfriend Derek was sitting in the kitchen area. 
R.253. He did not participate in the conversation. R.254. Derek's ex-wife was Brenda Mehl, 
the Brenda who had called Mary Tolman that day. R.127. 
The next day, Derek apparently1 called Brenda Mehl. told her he knew she had placed a 
trap and trace on her line, and told her it would not work. R.255. Brenda Mehl then called Mr. 
Gomez (Ms. Gibson's supervisor) to complain that her request for a trap and trace had been 
compromised. R.130. Mr. Gomez then called Ms. Gibson twice. R.130. During the second 
call, Ms. Gibson realized that Derek was Ms. Mehl's ex-husband, and that he must have guessed 
that it was his ex-wife that called for call tracing. R.256. 
After Mr. Gomez had apologized to Ms. Mehl, he called Ms. Gibson again and 
reprimanded her for the disclosure. R.256. Because he believed that Ms. Mehl was satisfied 
with his explanation of what had happened and the actions he took (reassigning her case, 
extending her trap and trace, and reprimanding both Ms. Tolman and Ms. Gibson), Mr. Gomez 
took no further action. R.130, 666. 
In February of 1991, Ms. Mehl contacted Tim Shryne of US West's Denver office to 
complain about the events of December 1990. R.131. Mr. Shryne then initiated an investigation. 
R.131. US West immediately suspended Ms. Gibson, Ms. Tolman and Mr. Gomez. R. 132. On 
March 1, 1991, US West terminated all three. R.133. 
1
 Mr. Mehl denied hearing the comment and making the call to his ex-wife. R.666. 
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In terminating Ms. Gibson, US West stated it was doing so for cause. In particular, it 
stated that she had violated US West's Code of Conduct, other US West policies and state law by 
revealing the contents of a court ordered wire tap. R.133. In fact, there never was a court 
ordered wire tap, nor did Ms. Gibson violate any state laws. R. 132-33. 
Upon learning of her suspension, Ms. Gibson sought help from the Communication 
Workers of America. R.133. The union sought to redress Ms. Gibson's injuries. R.667. When 
US West refused to honor its promise to Ms. Gibson, the union advised Ms. Gibson that it could 
not help her. R.667. 
The Summary Judgment Proceeding 
Ms. Gibson filed her lawsuit and in May of 1995, US West moved for summary 
judgment. R.119. It argued that Ms. Gibson failed to identify any "specific promises the 
company made to terminate her only for cause." R.139. Ms. Gibson responded that she had 
identified the US West's Employment Office's promise to her that her employment would be 
governed by the union contract. R.664. She further cited the terms of the union contract that 
only permitted termination for "just cause." R.667. 
In its Reply Memorandum, US West argued that Ms. Gibson must provide proof that US 
West and Ms. Gibson "intended a specific term or agreed to terminate the relationship for cause 
alone." R.693. It then argued that this proof is adequate "only if it meets traditional rules of 
contract formation." R.693-694. US West further argued that Gibson's testimony that 
"someone" in its Employment Office advised her that her employment would be governed by the 
union contract was insufficient under the Johnson test (employee's understanding insufficient to 
change employment from at will to contract). Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 812 P.2d 997, 1002 
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(Utah 1991). US West made no challenge to the foundation of Ms. Gibson's testimony. 
At the hearing, US West challenged both the credibility of Ms. Gibson's testimony, and 
for the first time, attacked its foundation. R.900-901. Ms. Gibson's counsel was surprised by 
US West's action and failed to advise the Court of Rule 32(c)(3)(B) and the fact that US West 
had not made any foundational objection at the time of Ms. Gibson's deposition. R. 904-12. The 
Court granted US West's motion for the "reasons set forth in [US West's] supporting 
memoranda." R.786. 
Thereafter, Ms. Gibson filed her Motion for relief from the Court's ruling under Rule 59. 
R.826. She argued that US West had improperly attacked the credibility and foundation of her 
deposition testimony and that giving proper weight to her testimony, the Court should have 
denied the Motion for Summary Judgment. R.844-48. The Court denied her motion. R.930. 
Ms. Gibson then filed this appeal. R.932. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ms. Gibson's testimony that a US West Employment Office representative advised her 
that her position as a Security Assistant would be governed by the union contract is unrebutted. 
Under the doctrine of apparent authority, Ms. Gibson was entitled to rely upon that 
representation. Under the test articulated in Johnson v. Morton Thiokol Ms. Gibson established 
a specific promise upon which she relied that established the terms of her contract. Thus, she 
was not an "at will" employee. 
Her testimony was given in answer to a question propounded by US West. There was no 
objection to the form of the question or the answer. By not asserting its foundational objection, 
US West waive this objection. Further, US West improperly attacked the credibility of Ms. 
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Gibson's testimony, thus seeking to have the trial court resolve doubts in its favor. 
Assuming that US West's commitment is honored and the union contract governs Ms. 
Gibson's employment, there are material facts in dispute as to whether US West had just cause to 
fire Ms. Gibson. US West's manager in charge of Ms. Gibson did not fire Ms. Gibson. Instead, 
he gave her a verbal reprimand. Again, resolving inferences in Ms. Gibson's favor, the trial 
court should have concluded that there was a material issue of fact as to whether Ms. Gibson's 
firing was for just cause. In any event, the union contract grants Ms. Gibson the right to seek 
mediation, binding arbitration or both. Ms. Gibson would be entitled to invoke those remedies if 
she prevails in her claim that she had an implied-in-fact contract with US West. 
If Ms. Gibson establishes her entitlement under an implied-in-fact contract, she can sue 
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and for severance pay damages. 
Thus, had the trial court properly reviewed the record evidence and properly applied Utah 
law, it would have denied the motion for summary judgment as to these three issues. 
ARGUMENT 
1. MS- GIBSON'S EMPLOYMENT WITH US WEST WAS GOVERNED BY THE 
TERMS OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT WITH THE 
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA; SHE WAS NOT AN "AT 
WELL" EMPLOYEE 
This case has several key facts that sets it apart from other "at will" wrongful discharge 
cases: 
1. For 18 years, Ms. Gibson was a union employee whose 
employment was governed by the collective bargaining agreement between US 
West and its union. R. 124. For 20 years, she had observed that US West treated 
its union and non-union employees the same. R.285-87. She had been told by 
supervisors that she would be treated fairly and not terminated except for cause. 
8 
R.286-287. When she went to US West's Employment Office to discuss the 
proposed transfer to a non-bargained for unit, she wanted the assurance that her 
employment would be governed by the union contract. R.918-19. 
2. Ms. Gibson testified that the US West Employment Office transfer 
counselor advised her that her new position would be governed by the union 
contract. R.919. 
3. US West did not add its disclaimer language to its Code of 
Business Conduct advising employees that all employees were "at will" until its 
August 1989 edition, after Ms. Gibson began work in her new position in April 
1989 (R.919). Compare R.158 etseq. and R.165 etseq. 
4. US West falsely claimed in its memorandum to the Court that Ms. 
Gibson read the 1989 Code of Business Conduct. R.135. Ms. Gibson testified 
she never saw the 1989 version until after her termination. R.717. 
Thus, where other employees signed documents at the inception of their employment 
acknowledging "at will" status {Kriberg v. West One Bank, 872 P.2d 39 (Utah App. 1994)) or 
received handbooks at the outset of the employment asserting employment was "at will" 
{Hamilton v. Parkdale Care Center, 904 P.2d 1110 (Utah App. 1995)), Ms. Gibson had worked 
for 18 years under the union contract, observed that US West treated union and non-union 
employees alike, wanted to make sure her new employment would be governed by the union 
contract, and received a specific promise that her employment would be governed by the union 
contract. Furthermore, she never saw US West's self serving changes in its Code of Business 
Conduct. 
As both parties agreed below, the Utah Supreme Court has established the methodology 
for analyzing this case in Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 812 P.2d 997,1002 (Utah 1991). The 
Court stated that the key is whether a unilateral contract has been formed. It explained: 
Under a unilateral contract analysis, an employer's promise of employment under 
certain terms and for an indefinite period constitutes both the terms of the 
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employment contract and the employer's consideration for the employment 
contract. The employee's performance of service pursuant to the employer's offer 
constitutes both the employee's acceptance of the offer and the employee's 
consideration for the contract. Therefore, for an implied-in-face contract term to 
exist, it must meet the requirements for an offer of a unilateral contract. There 
must be a manifestation of the employer's intent that is communicated to the 
employee and sufficiently definite to operate as a contract provision. 
Furthermore, the manifestation of the employer's intent must be of such a nature 
that the employee can reasonably believe that the employer is making an offer of 
employment other than employment at will. The unilateral nature of such an 
employment contract is important because it affects the flexibility of the 
employment relationship. 
In this case, when the transfer counselor advised Ms. Gibson that the union contract 
would govern her employment, that met the requirement of "a manifestation of the employer's 
intent that is communicated to the employee . . . sufficiently definite to operate as a contract 
provision."2 Moreover, Ms. Gibson's reliance on this promise was entirely reasonable. Not only 
had she observed that union and non-union employees were treated alike (R.285-287, 918), but 
she had been told by US West managers that they would treat union and non-union employees 
alike (R.285-287). Furthermore, her immediate supervisor, Mr. Gomez (a US West manager), 
testified that he had been repeatedly instructed that US West managers were to treat union and 
non-union employees alike, and he followed that practice. R.665. Finally, when US West fired 
Ms. Gibson, it did not advise her that it was exercising its unilateral right to fire an "at-will" 
2
 Apparently, US West is arguing that its transfer counselor could not orally change the 
"at-will" status expressly provided for in its to-be-published 1989 edition of its Code of Business 
Conduct. In addition to putting the cart before the horse, the Utah Supreme Court has expressly 
held: "At-will employment is a bundle of different privileges, any or all of which an employer 
can surrender through an oral agreement." Sanderson v. First Security Leasing Company, 844 
P.2d 303 (Utah 1992). 
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employee. Instead, it wrongly accused Ms. Gibson of disclosing a "court ordered" wire tap and 
committing a crime. R. 132-33. 
Since whether an implied-in-fact employment relationship exists is a question of fact, US 
West must show that no reasonable jury could find that an implied-in-fact contract existed. 
Kriberg v. West One Bank, 872 P.2d 39 (Utah App. 1994). Resolving disputed facts in Ms. 
Gibson's favor and taking all reasonable inferences from those facts, Ms. Gibson has shown a 
reasonable jury could find that she had an implied-in-fact contract with US West. 
2. ABSENT A TIMELY OBJECTION, US WEST MAY NOT ATTACK MS. 
GIBSON'S DEPOSITION TESTIMONY FOR LACK OF FOUNDATION; 
FURTHER, US WEST MAY NOT ATTACK THE CREDIBILITY OF HER 
TESTIMONY FOR PURPOSES OF A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
U.R.C.P. Rule 32(c)(3)(B) is designed to prevent the kind of surprise that US West used 
against Ms. Gibson in this case. Although it had never before attacked Ms. Gibson's testimony 
concerning her conversation with the US West Employment Office transfer counselor, during the 
oral argument, it argued: 
Importantly, the plaintiff relies on the statement that supposedly was made 
by someone in the Employment Office at the time she was moving to her job in 
the Security Office, to the effect that her employment would be upon the same 
terms and conditions as bargained for employees were entitled to under the 
collective bargaining agreement. 
There are two principal reasons why this statement cannot create an issue 
of fact and is insufficient to create an issue of fact. First of all, there is no 
foundation as to who made the statement. She simply says it was someone in the 
employment office of US West who made the statement. She didn't say who it 
was, whether it was a management employee, a secretary, or anyone else so there 
is no foundation, and if that kind of evidence were presented at the trial, it would 
not be admitted because it has insufficient foundation. 
More importantly, the person who made the statement, there is no 
evidence in the record that that person had any authority to make the statement, 
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and by making the statement alter the express intent of US West that employment 
was at will. 
R.900-01. 
Rule 32(c)(3)(B) prevents this type of surprise attack. 
Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral examination in the . . . the form of 
the questions or answers,... which might be obviated, removed, or cured if 
promptly presented are waived unless seasonable objection thereto is made at the 
taking of the deposition. 
U.R.C.P. Rule 32(c)(3)(B) (1995). If US West wanted to attack the foundational basis of Ms. 
Gibson's testimony, it needed to object at the deposition so that Ms. Gibson could have adduced 
additional testimony at the deposition or prepared a supporting affidavit with the additional 
information in preparation for the hearing. Recognizing the unfairness of these kinds of attacks, 
this Court has ruled that all objections to the sufficiency of evidence raised for the first time at a 
hearing are waived. D&L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 410 (Utah 1989). 
In addition, US West further attack the credibility of Ms. Gibson's testimony. In its brief, 
US West referred to the US West transfer counselor by placing the word "someone" in quotation 
marks. In continued its attack on the credibility of Ms. Gibson's testimony at the hearing. In 
referring to Ms. Gibson's reliance on the statement, US West referred to the statement as one 
"supposedly made." 
Ms. Gibson provided sufficient testimony to identify the US West office responsible for 
the statement made to her. Where she went to the US West Employment Office to seek advice 
concerning the possible transfer to the Security Office, Ms. Gibson was entitled to rely upon the 
apparent authority of US West's transfer counselor. As this Court has said: 
Basic agency law dictates that a principal is bound by the acts of an agent 
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clothed with apparent authority. [Citations omitted]. In Harrison v. Auto 
Securities Co., 70 Utah 11, 257 P. 677 (1927), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
It is a general principle of the law of agency, running 
through all contracts made by agents with third parties, that the 
principals are bound by the acts of their agents which fall within 
the apparent scope of the authority of the agents, and that the 
principals will not be permitted to deny the authority of their 
agents against innocent third parties, who hav£ dealt with those 
agents in good faith. 
Horrocks v. West/alia Systemat, 802 P.2d 14 (Utah App. 1995). 
Thus, US West unfairly attacks the foundation and credibility of Ms. Gibson's testimony. 
Moreover, rather than draw inferences in Ms. Gibson's favor, US West would have the court 
ignore its agent's apparent authority and infer that it was a secretary, with no authority, who 
advised Ms. Gibson she would be governed by the union contract. Utah law does not support US 
West's efforts to undermine Ms. Gibson's testimony. 
3. US WEST DID NOT HAVE JUST CAUSE TO FIRE MS. GIBSON 
For purposes of its Motion for Summary Judgment, US West assumed that Ms. Gibson's 
testimony was accurate. R.124. Based on her testimony, Ms. Gibson inadvertently disclosed to 
her sister Brenda that a person with her first name had requested a "trap and trace" at the Security 
Office. Her sister's boyfriend apparently3 overheard the comment, guessed who the other 
Brenda was, and the "trap and trace" was compromised. 
The US West manager who was in the best position to determine whether Ms. Gibson's 
inadvertent disclosure warranted firing was Ms. Gibson's immediate supervisor, Daniel Gomez. 
In light of her excellent record, the inadvertent nature of the disclosure, and the limited amount 
3
 The boyfriend denied hearing the remark or using the information. R.666. 
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of information disclosed, Mr. Gomez gave Ms. Gibson a verbal reprimand. R. 146-48. He 
testified that he understood that it was "his judgment call." R.162. When question about his 
actions, he testified that he had handled it properly. R.228.4 
Thus, Ms. Gibson has established that there are materials issues of disputed fact as to 
whether US West had just cause for terminating her. 
4. US WEST VIOLATED THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND 
FAIR DEALING THAT IS PART OF ITS CONTRACT WITH MS. GIBSON 
The Utah Supreme Court has forcefully stated that the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing cannot create contractual duties that did not already exist. Sanderson v. First 
Security Leasing Company, 844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992). Thus, Ms. Gibson has no claim for any 
breach under this claim until the Court holds that she has a justiciable claim under her implied-
in-fact contract. 
The union contract only permits firing for cause. R.667-68. In addition, the union 
contract authorizes an aggrieved employee to require US West to mediate, arbitrate or mediate 
and arbitrate any dispute that arises in the course of the employee's employment. When US 
West summarily fired Ms. Gibson, it denied her these rights under her contract. By so doing, US 
West violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
Thus, if the Court reverses Ms. Gibson's claim for wrongful discharge, it should also 
reverse the trial court's dismissal of her claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. 
4
 US West also attacked Mr. Gomez's testimony noting that he was fired for the same 
instance. While this may be probative at trial, it is irrelevant in a motion for summary judgment. 
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5. MS. GIBSON IS ENTITLED TO SEVERANCE PAY DAMAGES. 
The trial court held that Ms. Gibson was not entitled to severance pay because her 
discharge was not wrongful. R. 927; Addendum 1 p.3. If the Court of Appeals reverses the trial 
court's decision on the foregoing issues, the Court should reinstate this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in granting US West's Motion for Summary Judgment. The disputed 
evidence and inferences drawn in Ms. Gibson's favor establish that Ms. Gibson had an implied-
in-fact contract with US West, that US West breached that contract, and that it fired her without 
just cause. Thus, Ms. Gibson asks that the Court of Appeals reverse the dismissal of her first 
three causes of action (wrongful discharge, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing and severance pay) and direct those issues to proceed to trial. 
Dated July 1, 1996. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL 
larles M. Bennett 
Attorneys for Meredith Gibson 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of Ms. Gibson's APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF was mailed on this / day of July, 1996, to the following: 
Floyd Jensen 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
79 South Main St. 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
1. ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING 
COMPLAINT, dated November 9, 1995. 
2. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S RULE 59 MOTION AND OBJECTION, dated 
November 28,1995. 
3. NOTICE OF APPEAL, dated December 6,1995. 
1 
Tabl 
Floyd Andrew Jensen (Bar No. 1672) 
Janet Hugie Smith (Bar No. 3001) 
Lisa A. Yerkovich (Bar No. 5165) 
RAY. QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 S. Main, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Attorneys for Defendant 
U S WEST Communications, Inc. 
HUD DISTRICT COURT 
Third vludlcte! District 
DT THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
MEREDITH A. GIBSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 
a Colorado corporation. 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 930905599CV 
Judge J . Dennis Frederick 
BY THE COURT: 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing before the 
Court, the Honorable J . Dennis Frederick, District Judge, presiding, on October 2, 
1995, at 9:00 a.m. Defendant was represented by Floyd A. Jensen, and Plaintiff 
was represented by Charles Bennett. The motion was argued to the Court, and 
the Court took the matter under advisement. Having reviewed the arguments of 
counsel and the memoranda and other materials on file supporting and opposing 
the motion, including depositions and affidavits, relying on the reasons set forth in 
Defendant's supporting memoranda, and being thus fully advised in the premises, 
the Court rules that there are no genuine issues of material fact pertaining to 
Defendant's motion, and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
00092* 
dismissing Plaintiffs complaint and each cause of action therein, for the following 
reasons: 
1. Because Plaintiff failed to come forward with evidence that she was 
employed for a definite term, the law presumes that Plaintiff was an employee at 
will, whose employment could be terminated by Defendant at any time, for any 
reason or for no reason, with or without notice. 
2. The presumption of at-will employment is reinforced by statements in 
Defendants publications, all of which were issued prior to Plaintiffs termination, 
to the effect that employment with Defendant is at will. Such statements establish 
Defendant's intention to create or maintain an at-will employment relationship 
with its employees, including Plaintiff. 
3. To avoid summary judgment, Plaintiff had the burden to present admissible 
evidence showing that notwithstanding its published statements that employment 
with Defendant is at will, Defendant manifested a contrary intent and 
communicated that Intent to Plaintiff in a manner sufficiently definite to operate 
as a contract provision, and that the communication was of such a nature that 
Plaintiff could reasonably believe that Defendant was making an offer of 
employment other than employment at will. 
4. Plaintiff failed to present admissible evidence sufficient to satisfy her 
burden, as described above. Plaintiffs deposition testimony that an unidentified 
person in Defendants employment office told Plaintiff that her employment in 
Defendant's Security Department would be governed by the terms and conditions 
of a collective bargaining agreement is insufficient to raise an issue of material 
fact. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was not a member of the union during her 
2 
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tenure in the Security Department. Furthermore, the statement cannot be 
imputed to Defendant in the absence of foundational evidence as to the identity or 
authority of the person making the statement. Such evidence was wholly lacking. 
Finally, neither Plaintiffs understanding of her employment relationship, nor 
Defendant's general assurances regarding an ongoing employment relationship, 
are sufficient to demonstrate Defendant's intent to alter Plaintiffs presumed at-
will status. 
5. Even if an implied covenant not to discharge except for just cause existed. 
Plaintiff was terminated for just cause as a matter of law because she violated 
Defendant's policy against the disclosure of confidential information to persons 
not employed by Defendant, as set forth in Defendant's Code of Business Ethics 
and Conduct. Defendant's Code of Business Ethics and Conduct allowed 
Defendant to determine the measure of discipline for breach of its provisions. 
Plaintifif offered no evidence to establish that the Code of Conduct did not apply to 
her, or that Defendant had agreed to different terms with respect to her 
employment. 
6. As a matter of law, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does 
not create a for-cause standard of dismissal under Utah law; therefore, Plaintiffs 
claim for breach of such a covenant is not cognizable in this case. 
7. Plaintiffs claim for failure to pay severance pay fails as a matter of law 
because Plaintiffs discharge was not wrongful, and Plaintiff has presented no 
evidence to establish that Defendant had an obligation to pay severance pay to 
discharged employees. 
8- Plaintiffs defamation claim is barred by the one year statute of limitations 
in Utah Code Ann, § 78-12-29(4). Even if a discovery rule applied, Plaintiff knew 
of the defamatory statements more than one year prior to filing her complaint. 
Alternatively, even if the statute of limitations were not a bar, the alleged 
defamatory statements were qualifiedly privileged, because they were made by and 
to persons who had a legitimate interest in Plaintiffs discharge from employment 
and Plaintiff presented no evidence of excessive publication or actual malice on 
the part of Defendant. 
9. Plaintiff stipulated in open court and in her opposing memorandum that her 
negligence claim may be dismissed. Accordingly, the Court does not address the 
merits of that claim. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS that (1) Defendant's motion for 
summary judgment is granted, and (2) Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed in its 
entirety, with prejudice, Plaintiff tp tear the costs in the sum of $ . 
Dated this _ o^jQofobor, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM: 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Tab 2 
Floyd Andrew Jensen (Bar No. 1672) 
Janet Hugle Smith (Bar No. 3001) 
Lisa A. Yerkovich (Bar No. 5165) 
RAY, QU1NNEY & NEBEKER 
79 S. Main, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Attorneys for Defendant 
U S WEST Communications, Inc. 
•sassy 
NOV 2 8 895 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MEREDITH A. GIBSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 
a Colorado corporation. 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
RULE 59 MOTION AND 
OBJECTION 
Civil No. 930905599CV 
Judge J . Dennis Frederick 
BY THE COURT: 
Plaintiffs Rule 59 Motion for Denial of U S WESTs Motion for Summary 
Judgment and her Objection to Defendant's Proposed Order, together with 
supporting and opposing memoranda, were duly presented to and considered by 
the Court pursuant to a Notice to Submit for Decision. Having reviewed the 
memoranda and other materials on file supporting and opposing the motion, and 
being thus fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby ORDERS that Plaintiffs 
Motion and Objection are denied. \ 
Jptfay of MlF- 1995. 
BY 
Dated this 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM: 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of November, 1995,1 caused a copy of 
the foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS RULE 59 MOTION AND OBJECTION 
to be mailed by United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Charles M. Bennett 
Blackburn & Stoll 
77 W. 200 South 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101 





BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
CHARLES M. BENNETT (A0283) 
77 West 200 South St., Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)521-7900 
DISTRICT COURT 
c 5 DEC-8 &n9'-55 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Meredith A. Gibson - • —n^jrV CLE2K 
IN THE TfflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 




COMMUNICATIONS, INC., a 
Colorado Corporation, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 930905599 CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
* * * * * * * 
Plaintiff Meredith Gibson ("Ms. Gibson"), through counsel, gives notice that she is 
appealing to the Utah Supreme Court the District Court's Summary Judgment entered on 
November 9,1995 and the District Court's Denial of Ms. Gibson's Rule 59 Motion entered 
on November 28,1995. Ms. Gibson's appeals that part of the Summary Judgment that 
dismissed her first, second and third causes of action and all of the Court's denial of her 
Rule 59 Motion. 
Dated this J_ day of December, 1995. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Charles M. Bennett 
Attorneys for Meredith Gibson 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL 
was mailed, postage prepaid, on this ^ _ day of December, 1995, to the following: 
Floyd A. Jensen, Esq. 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
79 South Main Street, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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